This paper establishes several propositions concerning the importance of context in valuing public goods. It first provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the value of a public good to be independent of context. Utility-constant valuation sequences are considered where public goods are systematically made available or taken away. For the case of strict Hicksian substitutes, willingness to pay for an increase in one of the public goods is strictly decreasing the farther out in a sequence it is valued. For the destruction of public goods the reverse is true for willingness to accept compensation. Sequencing has opposite implications for the assessment of the benefits of providing public goods than for the assessment of the damage from destroying them. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION
The issue of valuing public goods, particularly environmental amenities, has moved to the forefront of policy discussions. 1 One disturbing aspect of valuation efforts is the observation that if one summed the public's estimated values for individual environmental amenities, the sum may exceed disposable income. Hoehn w x and Randall 8 point out that the problem lies in the adding together of individually derived willingness to pay estimates. There will typically be policy interactions that are missed when analysis is limited to individually-derived benefit estimates. w Hoehn and Randall conclude that ''conventional procedures independent valuax tions systematically overstate net benefits but also define a valid benefit cost w x approach.'' Focusing on substitution and complementarity in valuation, Hoehn 7 later concludes that independent valuation may either understate or overstate net benefits.
The analysis provided in this paper takes a somewhat different approach in addressing several related questions. Rather than assuming that policies are substitutes or complements in valuation, the focus is on local and global properties of preferences that offer potential explanations for complementarity or substitution in valuation. The first question addressed is in general, regardless of value Ž classifications as substitutes or complements, should the valuation context levels . of other public goods generally affect the value of a change in a particular public good? This question is affirmatively answered using a rationed goods representation of public goods 3 and drawing inferences from the relation between the rationed and unrationed consumption spaces. Necessary and sufficient conditions for context independence are characterized and shown to be very restrictive. The second question addressed is do there exist local conditions on preferences that imply value substitution or complementarity? It is established that the entire set of public goods being classified as Hicksian substitutes in the unrationed consumption space provides valuation substitutes. In contrast, if the entire set of public goods are classified as unrationed complements, this will ensure complementarity in valuation only in the limited case of two public goods. If there are three or more public goods, then the unrationed complementarity condition is insufficient to produce a set of public goods which are all complements in valuation.
In order to address multidimensional policy changes, utility-constant valuation sequences are used to establish that if a global substitutability condition is satisfied, sequencing has opposite implications for the assessment of provision benefits than for losses from destruction or injury. Willingness to pay for a particular public good decreases when valued later in a willingness to pay sequence, while willingness to accept compensation increases when valued later in a willingness to accept sequence.
A MODEL OF PUBLIC GOODS CONSUMPTION
Suppose that individuals have strictly convex preferences over n market goods and k public goods. Preferences are representable by a strictly quasiconcave utility function that is increasing in all arguments. It is further assumed that the utility function is twice continuously differentiable. The objective of consumers is to maximize utility in market goods subject to market prices, the budget constraint, and the level of public goods. Letting the vector X denote the levels of market goods, the vector Q the levels of public goods, and y the level of income, the problem is as follows: level of that public good as well as the level of all other public goods, a fact that figures prominently in this paper. The vector of marginal values is often referred to as virtual prices, a term adopted in this paper. 4 Suppose that two levels of public good i are under consideration with q 0 -q 1 and define the following reference
utility levels, U s¨p, q , Q , y and U s¨p, q , Q , y where Q reprei yi iyi yi w x w x sents the remaining k y 1 public goods. As shown by Maler 12 and Loehman 10 , the virtual prices have a direct link to willingness to pay and willingness to accept.
Ž . Using the relationship provided in 3 , willingness to pay and willingness to accept can be represented as the integral of the virtual price over the change in the public good. The two measures differ in the reference level of utility. The relationships between virtual prices and willingness to payrwillingness to accept facilitate an analysis of discrete changes using local properties of preferences. Imposing various preference conditions allows the determination of the substitutercomplementary classification between public goods.
As noted above in footnote 4, the virtual prices satisfy the condition that if the consumer were minimizing expenditures on both market and public goods subject to prices p and p¨, respectively, the same level of market and public 
The term virtual prices see Neary and Roberts 13 and Madden 11 is common in the rationed goods literature and refers to the fact that for a given level of rationing, the virtual prices satisfy the following condition. If the consumer were minimizing expenditures on all goods, including the public goods, facing prices p for market goods, p¨for public goods, and subject to the same level of utility, the same level of market and public goods would be chosen as in the original problem where Q is rationed. Using the lower right-hand corner set of differential equations and assuming nonsingularity of the matrix Ѩ Q h rѨ p¨, the following relationship exists
Thus, there exists an inverted relationship between the matrix of quantity derivatives of virtual prices and matrix of cross-price derivatives for the compensated demands of Q. Knowing this relationship gives rise to several propositions that provide insight into the substitutercomplement classification of values for Q.
PROPOSITIONS
Recently a great deal of attention has been focused on what has been referred to w x as embedding. Consider the following statement by Kahneman and Knetsch 9 :
The present article reports an experimental investigation of what is perhaps the most serious w x shortcoming of CVM contingent valuation method : that the assessed value of a public good is demonstrably arbitrary, because willingness to pay for the same good can vary over a wide range depending on whether the good is assessed on its own or embedded as part of a more inclusive package.
w x
Smith 16 provides an analysis of embedding in the case of a single public good and argues that embedding should be expected on account of substitution. Randall w x and Hoehn 14 demonstrate embedding for sequences of commodity price changes, as opposed to changes in the levels of public goods, based on estimates for w x consumer demand in the Dominican Republic reported by Yen and Roe 18 . w x In an earlier version of this paper, Carson, Flores, and Hanemann 1 use a general characterization of context independence and show that under the class of preferences considered in this paper, context independence is unlikely to be satisfied. 7 That paper develops a definition of context independence of virtual prices, provides necessary and sufficient conditions for virtual price context independence, extends these results to preference context independence, and then shows that the within the set of considered preferences, the subset of preferences exhibiting context independence is a closed set with no interior which is best understood using analogy. In a Euclidian space, as opposed to a functional space, we have a subset of measure zero. The definitions and propositions are provided here without proof. Ž .
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Ѩ p p, Q, U rѨ q s 0, j / 1 at all levels of Q.
1 j 6 w x This result is from Madden 11, lemma 1 . 7 Recall these preferences are those that can be represented by an increasing, strictly quasiconcave, twice differentiable utility function. 8 Interested readers are referred to the earlier version of this paper, Carson, Flores, and Hanemann w x 1 . 9 Note then that by symmetry, the marginal value of q is context independent if and only if the 1 derivative of p¨with respect to q will also be zero for all j / 1. 1 Let E denote the set of expenditure functions generated from preferences that can be represented by strictly increasing, strictly quasiconcave, twice differentiable utility functions.
PROPOSITION 3. Let S ; E such that for each e g S, e satisfies the condition of global context independence. Then S is a closed set with no interior.
Propositions 1᎐3 are based on the class of preferences that can be represented by strictly increasing, strictly quasiconcave, twice differentiable utility functions, a class that basically dominates applied microeconomic analysis. The three propositions establish that economic theory predicts that values of public goods will depend upon the levels of the public goods in a very general sense. The conclusion is that contextual valuation effects are the norm rather than the exception.
By imposing additional conditions, more precise predictions are possible. Matrices with off diagonals of like signs have been studied extensively and w x Takayama 17 has summarized many results pertaining to such matrices. Of particular interest in this case is the result that given the three conditions above, Under the Hicksian substitute assumption, the partial derivative is everywhere Ž . nonpositive negative over the path integral in q making the term in brackets Now let us consider the case of utility-constant valuation sequences, maintaining the Hicksian substitute assumption. These sequences are important because willingness to pay or willingness to accept for any multidimensional change can be decomposed into a sequence of single-dimensional changes which are easily analyzed using the framework from above. Proof. This proposition follows as a direct consequence of Proposition 4. When valued first in the sequence, the levels of q s 1, 2, . . . , k are at the initial level. Any permutation where the change q is valued later will result in higher levels of 1 substitute goods and thus a lower virtual price and willingness to pay. Valuing the change in q last in the sequence will result in the highest levels of substitute 1 goods, and hence, the lowest willingness to pay for the change in q . 1 Proposition 5 is important because it describes the effect of bundling and gives an economic reason why the sum of independent valuations for each item in the bundle is more than the value of the bundle. As more substitutes are added to the bundle of changes, the value of the bundle will be less than the independent valuations because of successively higher levels of other public goods. Proof. All conditions are similar to Proposition 5 with the exception that as the change in q is placed later in the sequence, the level of substitute goods is 1 decreasing. Decreasing levels of substitute goods imply an increasing virtual price and willingness to accept. Therefore, willingness to accept compensation for the reduction in q increases when placed later in the sequence and is smallest when 1 placed first in the sequence.
The analysis has so far focused on situations of a generic level of utility for both the willingness to accept sequence and the willingness to pay sequence. In practice, the true object of interest is often the willingness to accept compensation for a prescribed change at the utility level before the change, but for various reasons, willingness to pay for the same change at the post-change utility level is used as an approximation. Let us assume that willingness to accept exceeds willingness to pay. 10 Suppose q 1 ) q 0 for all i s 1, 2, . . . , k. Let U 1 be the maximum attainable i i utility given prices p, income y and public good q s q
be the maximum level of utility attainable given the same p, y, and levels of q , j j s 2, 3, . . . , k, but q s q 0 . Then U 1 ) U 0 and the following inequality follows:
H H w x In the case of a single rationed good, Hanemann 6 shows that if the rationed good is an Ž . unrationed normal good positive income effect , then the reference utility level will lead to a higher difference in expenditures. For multiple rationed goods this may not always be the case, but is assumed here. Now consider willingness to pay versus willingness to accept for this same q 1 quantity change, but in the different valuation contexts described above. That is, we are interested in the implication of sequencing on the valuations using willingness to pay with utility level U 0 and the decreased level of q versus willingness to 1 pay with utility level U and the higher level of q . 
Ž .
Proof. Note inequality 8 above and consider a willingness to accept sequence. By applying Proposition 7, the valuation is increasing when placed farther out in the willingness to accept sequence. Similarly by Proposition 5, willingness to pay for the prescribed change is greatest when valued first in a willingness to pay sequence leading to the desired result.
Proposition 8 has particular relevance in the area of natural resource damage assessment. In damage assessment analysis, willingness to pay is often used as a proxy for willingness to accept. Putting aside measurement errors due to the various valuation techniques, willingness to pay for restoration alone, as opposed to combining with other goods, will be the closest in magnitude. w x Madden 11 provides what he refers to as R classifications of compensated demands which apply to the work presented above. The unrestricted Hicksian substitution condition presented above yields R substitutes within all of the rationed goods. Madden shows that the R classifications ''favor substitutes'' in that for every good i, rationed and unrationed, there must always be at least one other good j that is an R substitute for i. This statement has significance here since one can ask the question, what happens when all rationed goods are unrestricted Hicksian complements? Might it be the case then that, similar to the case where all rationed goods are Hicksian substitutes, the derivative of the implicit prices with Ž . respect to other quantities is positive as opposed to negative ? This question is answered by the following proposition. Thus depending upon the relative sizes of the terms in H , the off-diagonals of Q Ѩ p¨rѨ Q may or may not be all positive when all rationed goods are unrestricted Hicksian complements.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides a general treatment of the implications of context and sequencing in the valuation of public goods. The treatment is based entirely on economic theory and eschews the consideration of alternative theories grounded in moral or psychological considerations. The paper formalizes what to most economists is basic economic intuition: The value of a public good is dependent upon the context in which it is provided. Using a formal economic model while adopting reasonable assumptions, we produce results consistent with one description of embedding.
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Admittedly our analysis does not completely resolve the issue of embedding. Some will argue that observed differences in values under different contexts are too large to be plausible. While our analysis does not explicitly address this issue, the fact that economic theory leaves open the possibility of a wide range of circumstances suggests a cautionary approach when attempting to judge whether economic theory or some alternative theory is at work. Meaningful judgement will require a clear understanding of the realm of economic possibilities and we feel that our analysis is useful to this end.
There are several policy implications that follow from these results. In order to make well-informed policy decisions, careful attention should be paid to policy interactions. As shown in Proposition 9 for discrete values and discussed by w x Madden 11 for marginal values, R classifications favor substitutes. Thus summing independent values for increases in provision will more often overestimate the value of a package of changes; for decreases the opposite is true. Thus, the status quo, as interpreted by the agent, plays a key role in accurately assessing the impacts of multidimensional changes.
Our results do not make independent valuations obsolete. With some confidence we can infer that if the sum of independent valuations for increases is less than the costs of provision for a package of increases, then the package of increases should not be undertaken. 12 In cases when the sum of independent values exceeds the cost of providing the package, confidence should necessarily diminish. Again for decreases, things work in opposite directions. Using willingness to pay as an approximation of willingness to accept is by definition a conservative estimate. Any 11 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, many issues are lumped under the rubric of embedding.
w x This paper focuses on the description summarized in the Kahneman and Knetsch 9 quote found at the beginning of Sec. 3. 12 It may still be beneficial to undertake a subset of the increases.
attempt to combine the increase that is valued and then used as the approximation will only serve to move the estimate further away from the desired willingness to accept.
